THE NEW DETERRENCE:
CRIME AND POLICY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

Patrick J. Keenan*
Crime has historically been a local phenomenon. Most murder victims
know their killers;1 most victims of child abuse know their abusers;2 victims
of theft often need not look beyond their own neighborhoods for the thieves.
Crime is regulated locally. In the United States, it is the states, not the
federal government, that prosecute the vast majority of criminal cases.3 Law
enforcement budgets may rely on funds from the federal government, but
enforcement priorities are set locally. And although there is some
coordination among law enforcement agencies from different states in the
U.S. and between agencies from different countries, crime remains a local
problem.
Globalization is changing this in ways that have yet to be fully explored.
Although crime as an event will always have a substantial local component
because it is typically responded to by officials and victims in the place it
occurs, it is becoming much more of a transnational phenomenon. It is
increasingly common for activity that is regulated in one country because it
is dangerous or unwanted to become more common in other countries where
the activity is equally (or almost equally) unwanted but much less
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The victim and offender know each other in approximately 76% of
homicide cases. SHANNAN M. CATALANO, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2003
1 (Bureau of Justice Statistics National Crime Victim Survey 2004).
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OFFENDERS AND THEIR Victims 10 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1996)
(reporting that 85.9% of child victims knew their victimizer).
3
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effectively regulated. What happens when activity that is unwanted in two
places is more effectively regulated in one place than in the other? Does the
unwanted activity migrate from the first state to the second? How much of
it migrates, and what factors influence the amount of displacement? How
should we conceive of regulation in these circumstances--as a local response
to a local problem or as part of a broader effort to reduce the overall
incidence of the unwanted activity? These questions are fundamental to
determining what globalization will mean in the new century, but so far
have not been fully explored. The existing scholarship on deterrence will be
of limited use in a globalized context.
This article is the first attempt to fill the gap by developing a richer
approach to deterrence for a globalized world. I draw insights from both
law-and-economics and criminology literature to enrich our understanding
of deterrence. To ground my theoretical discussion in a real-world problem,
throughout the article I use sex tourism as an example of the kind of
unwanted activity that now crosses borders and has complicated our
understanding of deterrence. I focus on two issues central to deterrence in a
globalized world that have not gotten sufficient scholarly attention: the
phenomenon of displacement and the role of status. I add three important
considerations. First, I argue that informal sanctions, as opposed to formal,
legal sanctions, are increasingly important and must be part of any effective
deterrence policy. Second, I argue that substitution—when activity migrates
from one location to another because of changes in enforcement policy in
the first place—is a complicated process that can be manipulated to enhance
deterrence. Finally, I argue that when unwanted behavior involves people
from different countries, we must consider the role of status in deterrence.
Differences in status can distort the social processes of judgment and
disapproval that allow communities to control unwanted behavior without
recourse to law. These are vitally important issues. Because globalized
crime is so widely dispersed, it will be almost impossible for the local
communities affected to get together and develop a coordinated plan. If we
are to prevent law enforcement successes in the West from turning into
social disasters for those in the developing world, we must bring theory into
step with the ways that globalization has changed the reality of crime.
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I begin with an illustration
of the kind of phenomenon that drives my analysis: sex tourism, the
practice of tourists traveling abroad to engage in sex with prostitutes, often
children. Any discussion of deterring unwanted activity on a global scale
could have significance in the spheres of terrorism, white collar crime,
money laundering, environmental activity, and commercial regulation. But
I use the example of sex tourism because it contains stark examples of the
kinds of legal and social issues at the heart of deterrence. In this part, I
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describe the ways that the tools of globalization have allowed sex tourism to
grow and thrive.
In Part II, I lay out and critique the literature that frames the current
discourse on crime and its deterrence. The literature fits into two broad
categories: economics and sociology (or criminology). The law-andeconomics literature assumes that people deciding whether to engage in
activity that is unwanted by the larger society behave rationally. That is,
potential offenders weigh the utility they will receive from the activity
against two factors: the probability of being caught engaging in the activity
and the sanction they would suffer if caught. The law-and-economics
approach is general; it simplifies complex phenomena so they can be
modeled and examined. But simplification can render the results of the
model of only marginal use in a world populated by individual people, each
motivated by her own reasons and emotions. At the other extreme is the
work of criminologists and sociologists. This literature often considers the
motivations of individual offenders in an attempt to understand the amalgam
of reasons that people commit crimes (or, for that matter, engage in any
activity, criminal or not).4 This literature is often too specific to be of use in
shaping policy.
Parts III and IV are the heart of the article. Part III contains the first of
my refinements of the traditional view of deterrence. The most basic model
draws on a straightforward law-and-economics framework and considers
three variables: the utility that the desired illegal behavior will bring to the
offender, the probability that he will be detected, and the expected legal
sanction. This rational choice framework underlies most discussions of
deterrence. More sophisticated law-and-economics models attempt to
account for the possibility that an increase in the cost of one crime (either
through a harsher punishment or stricter enforcement) will lead the offender
to substitute another activity for the preferred crime.5 These models
4

Dan Kahan, among a handful of others, has attempted to chart a
“third way” that “combines the virtues of both economics and sociology
without succumbing to the vices of either.” Dan M. Kahan, Between
Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2477 (1997). Kahan’s work has highlighted many of the issues important to
a richer understanding of deterrence, but does not (and does not purport to)
address the complex issues that arise when unwanted activity crosses
borders.
5

Underlying my argument are two broad assumptions that I must
acknowledge at the outset. First, I assume that, in most cases, the regulation
of unwanted activity is more effective in the West than in the developing
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compare two deterrence equations to ask if the benefit from new activity,
reduced by the costs mentioned above, is greater than the benefit from the
original activity (also reduced by the two costs). I argue that these models,
in their attempt at simplicity, leave out an important factor. In most models,
substitution is assumed to be a costless transaction. This assumption-dubious even with regard to domestic crime--is at odds with the reality of
transnational activity.
There are substantial risks associated with
displacement or substitution,6 including the costs of switching from one
activity to another, gathering information on the second activity, and the
cost of violating norms against the new activity. When these factors are
included in the equation, what seem to be adequate policy responses begin
to look inadequate.
Part IV addresses the complicated role that status plays in deterrence.
Most considerations of deterrence spend no time considering the effect of
status differences in deterring transnational crimes.7 Status is important to
deterrence in a variety of ways. My discussion centers on its role in the
creation, enforcement, and erosion of social norms, the social rules and
customs that guide and govern the behavior of most people. In Part V I
briefly conclude by attempting to apply the lessons of theory to policy
options.
Before moving on, three clarifications are in order. “Globalization” is a
slippery term that is used to explain any number of ills and benefits. I use a
world. Because of this, globalization combined with the difference in the
effectiveness of regulation between the West and the developing world can
have the effect of displacing illegal, unwanted, or anti-social activity from
the West to other parts of the world. In other words, effective regulation in
the West can lead to the export of social or commercial problems from the
West to the developing world. Such displacement can carry serious
consequences for both the West and the developing world. Second, I argue
that regulations that target unwanted activity can and should account for the
potential for displacement. To be considered effective, regulations must
reduce the incidence of the problem they seek to regulate, not merely
transfer it elsewhere.
6

I use the terms "substitution" and "displacement" interchangeably.
For my purposes, both describe the same phenomenon; substitution is the
term preferred by economics, while criminologists typically use
displacement.
7

Criminologists study status when considering the relationship
between victims and perpetrators, for example, but my consideration of
status focuses on its role in deterrence.
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definition adopted from Joseph Stiglitz, formerly chief economist at the
World Bank and the head of President Bill Clinton's council of economic
advisors. As I use it, globalization means the closer integration of the
countries and peoples of the world due to a radical reduction in the
transaction costs associated with transnational activity. This is due mostly
to a reduction in costs of transportation and communication.8 It means that
transnational activity happens more quickly, more easily, and more often
than in the past. In other words, it is now possible for vast numbers of
people to do very often what small numbers of people used to do only
occasionally. Two types of activity fit into my definition of "unwanted
activity." Unwanted activity either violates the law or violates norms or
customs, regardless of whether it is legal or illegal. I define unwanted
activity in this way to account for both illegal and socially-unacceptable but
legal activities. By "regulation," I mean actions that aim to reduce the
incidence of behavior. This can take the form of criminal prohibitions,
which have as their goal the elimination of an activity. It can take the form
of administrative rules or other statutes that seek to set the conditions under
which an activity may be undertaken. It can also take the form of the
intentional creation or support of helpful norms that reduce the incidence of
unwanted activity by encouraging people to choose not to engage in the
activity. By using this broad definition, I wish to encompass any attempt to
restrain, limit, or regularize activity that is in any way unwanted.
I. THE NEW MOBILITY OF UNWANTED ACTIVITY: THE EXAMPLE OF SEX
TOURISM
Sex tourism happens when tourists from North America, Western and
Northern Europe, Japan, and Australia travel to the developing world to
have sex with prostitutes, often including child prostitutes. It has exploded
in recent years.9 Sex tourism, and the illicit sexual activity that is at its
heart, has many elements, as do the many forms of regulation that exist to
suppress it. On the supply side of the equation are prostitutes, including
8

Stiglitz writes that globalization is "the closer integration of
countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the
enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, the
breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital,
knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders." JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 9 (2002).
9

2004.

See, e.g., Sex Tour Travel Agencies Targeted, USA TODAY, Feb. 13,
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children,10 and those who facilitate their exploitation, like brothel owners
and sex tour organizers and operators. On the demand side are tourists who
patronize prostitutes. The industry thrives because suppliers and tourists can
exploit the tools of globalization to find each other. Brothel owners take
advantage of porous borders and the easy flow of capital to find, buy, and
transport prostitutes.11 They also rely on the inequalities brought to light by
globalization for a steady supply of recruits, either misled into the industry
or sold by their families. Tourists use the Internet to gather information
about sex tourist destinations,including strategies on ways to avoid
detection, and they rely on easier travel to get to the prostitutes. The
purpose of examining sex tourism is to better understand the problem of
globalized crime and to provide a real-world example to ground the
theoretical discussion.
A. Illicit Sexual Behavior and Globalization
Although it is little known in the U.S., the problem of sex tourism has
begun to attract significant attention internationally. In recent years there
has been a spate of reports on the increase in sex tourism.12 Accurate
10

See Heather Montgomery, Child Sex Tourism in Thailand, in
TOURISM IN THE LESS DEVELOPED WORLD: ISSUES AND CASE STUDIES 191201 (David Harrison, ed., 2001); see generally CHRIS RYAN & C. MICHAEL
HALL, SEX TOURISM: MARGINAL PEOPLE AND LIMINALITIES (2001).
11

See JOANE NAGEL, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND SEXUALITY: INTIMATE
INTERSECTIONS, FORBIDDEN FRONTIERS 212-216 (2003); see generally
RYAN BISHOP & LILLIAN S. ROBINSON, NIGHT MARKET: SEXUAL CULTURES
AND THE THAI ECONOMIC MIRACLE (1998); SIETSKE ALTINK, STOLEN LIVES:
TRADING WOMEN INTO SEX AND SLAVERY (1995).
12

See, e.g., UNICEF, STUDY ON THE SEXUAL ABUSE AND
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE GAMBIA (2003); CASA ALIANZA,
REGIONAL INVESTIGATION ON TRAFFICKING, PROSTITUTION, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX TOURISM WITH CHILDREN IN CENTRAL AMERICA
AND MEXICO (2001); ELENA AZAOLA, UNICEF-DEF, BOY AND GIRL
VICTIMS OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN MEXICO (2000); UNICEF, CHILDREN
ON THE EDGE: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND
TRAFFICKING IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC [hereinafter CHILDREN ON THE
EDGE]; JUDITH O'CONNELL DAVIDSON & JACQUELINE SANCHEZ TAYLOR,
ECPAT, CHILD PROSTITUTION AND SEX TOURISM: COSTA RICA (1995);
JUDITH O'CONNELL DAVIDSON & JACQUELINE SANCHEZ TAYLOR, ECPAT,
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numbers are hard to come by, but the United Nations estimates that there are
at least 2 million child prostitutes worldwide.13 The most common
destination countries are in Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America.
UNICEF estimates that there are 400,000 child prostitutes in Thailand,14 and
that half of those involved in prostitution are trafficked; that is, they are sold
or traded to brothel owners. Reports by non-governmental organizations put
the number of adult female prostitutes at 300,000 and children at 75,000 in
the Philippines and between 10,000 and 15,000 in Cambodia.15 The
CHILD PROSTITUTION AND SEX TOURISM: THAILAND (1994); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, A MODERN FORM OF SLAVERY: TRAFFICKING OF BURMESE
WOMEN AND GIRLS INTO BROTHELS IN THAILAND (1993) [hereinafter A
MODERN FORM OF SLAVERY].
13

CNN, “Sex Tourism” Rapist Jailed in France (Oct. 20, 2000),
available
at
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/france/10/20/france.trial/
(last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
14

Id. In my discussion of sex tourism, I group together those who
patronize child prostitutes and those who patronize adult prostitutes. Even
though these activities are normatively distinct, I consider them together for
several reasons. First, both kinds of prostitution are part of the same market;
they rely on the same supply chain for prostitutes (often human trafficking),
and they advertise to the same pool of potential customers. See, e.g., A
MODERN FORM OF SLAVERY, supra note 12; FRANCIS T. MIKO & GRACE
JEA-HYUN PARK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TRAFFICKING IN
WOMEN AND CHILDREN: THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE (2002).
Second, it is often not possible to make clean age distinctions. For example,
consider a country in which the age of majority is 15, meaning that a
prostitute who would be considered a child in the U.S. is considered an
adult. When a customer patronizes a 15-year-old prostitute, it is unclear
whether he is engaging in “child sex tourism” or just “sex tourism.” See
generally RYAN & HALL, supra note 10, at 22-46. Finally, some who
patronize prostitutes in the developing world do so because they want to
engage in illicit sexual activity with someone who appears to be a child or
adolescent, even if she really is not. For all of these reasons, it is more
helpful to treat child and adult prostitutes together than to separate them.
15

COALITION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, Facts and Statistics:
Trafficking and Prostitution in Asia and the Pacific, at www.catwap.org/facts.htm.
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problem is not limited to Asia. In San Jose, the capital of Costa Rica, there
are an estimated 2000 girl child prostitutes.16 According to estimates by the
Organization of American States, there are 2000 child prostitutes in
Guatemala City; 25,000 in the Dominican Republic; and as many as 500,000
in Brazil.17 Cuba receives as many as 200,000 male sex tourists every
year.18 Children become prostitutes through a variety of means. Some are
sold or traded away by relatives.19 Some are promised legitimate jobs in the
city and willingly accompany procurers, only to be sold or traded to brothel
owners.20 Some run away from home and enter the trade to feed
themselves.21
B. The Logistics of the Industry
The demand side of the business is equally complex and also depends on
globalization. Sex tourists rely on technology to exchange information
about the best places to exploit children and avoid detection by law
enforcement, use global transportation to travel to destination countries, and
exploit income inequalities and market pressures that have forced so many
children into prostitution. It starts with travelers, usually but not always
men,22 who sexually exploit local people, often including children. Like

16

ALISON PHINNEY, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN THE
AMERICAS, available at www.oas.org/cim/english/proj.traf.alisonpaper.htm.
17

Id.

18

Michael Clancy, The Globalization of Sex Tourism and Cuba: A
Commodity Chains Approach, 36 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEVELOPMENT 63
(2002).
19

See, e.g., CHILDREN ON THE EDGE, supra note 12, at 5-6.

20

See, e.g., UNICEF, BROKEN PROMISES SHATTERED DREAMS:
PROFILE OF CHILD TRAFFICKING IN THE LAO PDR 22 (2004).
21

See e.g., A MODERN FORM

OF

A

SLAVERY, supra note 12, at 24-29

(1993).
22

See Mario Scarpati, Preliminary Results of a Study on the Profile
of CSEC Clients: Sex Tourists and Internet Users, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
REGIONAL CONSULTATION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ON THE PROTECTION
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most tourists, the vast majority of sex tourists follow one of two typical
routes: organized tours and individually-planned vacations. Both routes
have been enhanced by globalization. Those on organized tours avoid many
of the risks faced by independent sex tourists, who must arrange their own
travel and encounters with prostitutes. Philippine Adventure Tours (which
is no longer in business), provided a typical tour. For less than $2000, a
tourist could receive round-trip airfare, a hotel in Manila, and a guide tour of
bars where he could obtain the services of a prostitute.23 A tour guide was
even available to help the sex tourist negotiate with the prostitute or her
procurer. Other tour operators offer similar tours to Thailand for $1800$2500.24
Notwithstanding these organized tours, the majority of sex tourists are
independent. They travel alone,25 and find prostitutes on their own. Those
who travel alone face the risks associated with making their own
arrangements, such as how much to pay or whom to bribe.26 For many, their
activity is possible only because of the disparate elements that make up
globalization, such as easy international travel and wealth disparities that
help push children into prostitution. But the improvement in information
technology is likely the single most important factor in the explosion of sex
tourism. Usenet newsgroups provide a useful forum for sex tourists because
most focus on a single topic and allow users to post information
anonymously. Although they are typically not secure--access is not
restricted by password, for example--an estimated 1000 illegal pornographic

CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN TOURISM 53-54 (2003)
(reporting that 99% of clients of child sex workers are men).
OF

23

CAPTIVE DAUGHTERS, CD FACT SHEET 1:
LEARNING MODEL (1999).

SEX TOURS - A

24

Toddi Gutner & Ron Corben, Asian Sex Tours are an American
Business, Too, BUS. WK., June 17, 1996.
25

Joshua Kurlantzick, Harm's Way: Child Sex Tourism Feeds
Thailand's Economy, IN THESE TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000.
26

See Kay Johnson, Pedophile Playground, TIME, Nov. 13, 2000, at
29 (describing sex tourist’s unsuccessful attempt to bribe law enforcement
officials and his subsequent conviction in local court); see also Teacher
Jailed for Kiddie Porn, MELBOURNE HERALD SUN, Nov. 22, 2000, at 34
(same).
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images are posted on newsgroups each week.27 Bulletin and message
boards, which often require users to enter a password, ensuring an added
layer of security, have become another important forum in which sex
tourists can exchange information.28 On some message boards, users seek
and provide information about the kinds of acts they desire from prostitutes
and identify for others the names of prostitutes who are willing to engage in
them.29 There is also information about the cost of the acts and even news
about particular prostitutes.30 The various technologies allow sex tourists to
gather all the information they need for a "successful" trip: where to find
prostitutes, where to stay to avoid discovery, how much to pay (depending
on the status of the prostitute and the sexual act), and how much to bribe
local law enforcement officials to avoid prosecution if caught.31
II. THEORIES OF OFFENDING AND DETERRENCE
None of the existing theories of offending and deterrence provides an
adequate account of how we should address unwanted activity that crosses
national boundaries as sex tourism does. This Part focuses on the two
dominant existing approaches to deterrence (and to understanding criminal
behavior generally), economic analysis and sociological (or criminological)
analysis, and examines their deficits in a globalized world. Deterrence is to
many the holy grail of criminal law policy. Preventing the commission of a
crime not only spares potential victims, it also reduces the costs to society of
investigating, prosecuting, and punishing offenders.
The law-andeconomics approach to deterrence policy is to find just the right balance
between the costs of enforcing the laws on the one hand and the severity of

27

See DONNA M. HUGHES, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE IMPACT OF THE
USE OF NEW COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES ON
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 10 (May 2001).
28

See id.

29

See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FINAL REPORT: GROUP OF
SPECIALISTS ON THE IMPACT OF THE USE OF NEW INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES ON TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 18 (2003).
30
31

See HUGHES, supra note 27, at 20.

See Scott Worden, E-Trafficking, FOREIGN POLICY, March 2001, at
92; Kurlantzick, supra note 24.
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the penalty for an unwanted activity on the other. The goal is to reduce the
activity to the desired level as efficiently as possible. Underlying the lawand-economics approach is the idea of rational choice, the assumption that
individuals “are forward looking and behave so as to maximize their
expected utility.”32
Sociologists have the same goal--reducing crime--but approach it by
attempting to identify the myriad influences on a potential offender: her
choice of crime, her selection of victims, her relationships with other
potential offenders, and a host of others. This is, of course, immensely
complicated, and has spawned a welter of writing. Sociologists typically
focus on individuals or small groups of offenders and try to uncover the
many motivations that move every offender.
Just as economists and sociologists have different approaches to
understanding criminal behavior, so too they have different approaches to
deterring offending behavior. Economists typically focus on only two
variables: the level of investment in enforcing the law, and the severity of
the legal sanctions that an offender faces upon conviction of a crime. The
solutions proposed by sociologists typically use a broader array of policy
interventions. To reduce crime, sociologists might suggest alleviating
poverty, changing family dynamics, or improving education.
In this Part I lay out the conventional analyses of deterrence and draw
lessons from the various theories. I start by describing the first law-andeconomic model, which weighs the utility that a person expects to receive
from an activity against the costs of the activity. The first models were
followed by more complex analysis, including consideration of the
substitution effect, which occurs when an offender responds to the rising
cost of his preferred activity by abandoning it and moving into another
activity, which may be equally harmful. After describing the law-andeconomics approach, I consider sociological or criminological theories of
deterrence. These theories focus to varying degrees on individual traits that
incline a person toward unwanted activity or environmental factors which
might encourage criminal behavior.
Finally, I draw lessons from
conventional approaches. First, the law-and-economic model is useful
because it helps to identify the costs associated with each choice. By
identifying these disincentives, policy makers can more accurately
determine how to increase the costs of unwanted activity. I use sociological
theories and evidence to expand the list of costs beyond those considered by
the law-and-economics models. Second, I conclude that informal sanctions-those in addition to formal legal sanctions--are increasingly important and

32

STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC LAW 1 (2004).
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must be included in any model. Finally, I conclude that sociological models
consider, in a way that law-and-economics does not, one of the
consequences of globalization--that the transaction costs associated with
unwanted activity have declined significantly, thereby changing the entire
cost structure of criminal behavior.
A. Economic Analysis and Deterrence
In the last forty years, some of the most important work on deterrence
has been influenced by the insights of economists. Gary Becker, in an
article in 1968, initiated the modern use of economic analysis to study the
criminal law.33 The goal of most writers has been to determine how to most
efficiently deter crimes by setting an appropriately severe sanction and
investing adequately in enforcement of the laws. Becker argued that, for
most potential law breakers, deterrence depended on a simple balance.34 On
one side were the benefits that committing the act would bring to the law
breaker.35 On the other side were the costs of the crime, which Becker
defined as a function of the probability of detection and the severity of the
expected legal sanction.36 Since Becker's influential work there have been
many refinements, but most economic models of deterrence have contained
the same simplifying assumptions and many of the same elements.
In this section, I trace the development of economic models of
deterrence. I begin by reviewing the first, simple models. I then discuss an
important addition to the model: consideration of the substitution effect.
Substitution occurs when the cost of the preferred activity goes up and the
actor chooses to substitute a less costly activity in the place of the preferred
activity. As I will explain, the substitution effect is critically important to
any discussion of transnational unwanted activity.

33

Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). Becker was not the first to apply economic
analysis to the study of criminal law. See, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, ON
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS; JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW.
34

Becker, supra note 33, at 176 ("a person commits an offense if the
expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and
other resources at other activities").
35

Id.

36

Id. at 169.
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1. A Simple Model of Deterrence
Deterrence models typically involve a simple calculation: a criminal
will "commit the act if and only if his expected utility from doing so, taking
into account his gain and the chance of his being caught and sanctioned,
exceeds his utility if he does not commit the act."37 That is, a person
considering whether to break the law weighs the benefit to him of the crime
against the costs of committing the crime.38 The costs of committing a
crime are the severity of the expected legal sanction and the likelihood that
the criminal will suffer the sanction.39 Combining the two elements
accounted for the intuition that potential criminals care about the severity of
the sanction and the chance that they will actually suffer it, and that the two
are closely linked. Measures that increase the costs of committing a
particular crime are assumed to make it less likely that a criminal will
commit that crime, thereby contributing to deterrence. The conventional
model is useful because it highlights the two most important elements of the
criminal law equation, not just for potential law breakers but for
policymakers as well. Both enforcement and severity carry substantial costs
for society and the model is a way of seeking the most efficient level of
investment in each element.40 A massive investment in enforcement will
not operate as a significant deterrent if sentences are too low, and even a

37

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of
Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 47 (2000).
38

This is, of course, a version of rational choice theory. There are
many definitions of rational choice. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998)
(rationality means "choosing the best means to the chooser's ends"); A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10 (2d.
Ed. 1989) (economic analysis assumes "utility maximization," which means
that "individuals ... maximize their benefits, less their costs"). What all the
definitions have in common is the presumption "that individuals act so as to
maximize their expected utility." Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law
and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075 (2000).
39
40

Becker, supra note 33, at 204.

See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Law, 78
J. POL. ECON. 526, 526-27 (1970) ("society must forego 'complete'
enforcement' of the laws because enforcement is costly").
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severe sentence will be a weak deterrent if criminals know that they will not
be caught.
2. The Substitution Effect
The conventional model has much to commend it, but it leaves out
several important elements. After Becker's groundbreaking work, others
refined his model because it did not account for the full complexity of
decision making. One problem arises when two crimes, one of which
causes substantially more harm than the other, are subject to the same
penalty. The fear is that increasing the costs associated with one crime may
actually cause the incidence of another crime to go up. According to the
conventional model, in this circumstance a potential law breaker has no
incentive to choose the less harmful of the two acts. The problem is perhaps
most salient when considering closely related activities that differ only in
magnitude: "If the offender will be executed for a minor assault and for a
murder, there is no marginal deterrence to murder. If the thief has his hand
cut off for taking five dollars, he had just as well take $5,000."41 One
response to the problem, which George Stigler called "marginal
deterrence,"42 is to impose harsher penalties for more severe crimes to
remove any incentive to commit a more severe version of the same crime.43
Marginal deterrence is most commonly discussed in terms of the
severity of the penalty for unwanted acts. Indeed, Stigler's discussion of
marginal deterrence was a response to Becker's argument that penalties
should always be set at the most severe level. Becker's argument was that,
because potential law breakers consider both the severity of the penalty and
the probability of detection, and because it is less expensive to increase the
severity of a penalty than it is to invest in more effective enforcement,
increasing the severity of the penalty is a costless way to increase
deterrence. The costs associated with a crime can also be increased by
making it more likely that the criminal will suffer the legal sanction by, for
example, investing in greater enforcement.44
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Id. at 527.
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Id.
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See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 63 ("Deterrence of a
more harmful act because its expected sanction exceeds that for a less
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Marginal deterrence is a version of the substitution effect, an idea central
to economic theory. To see the substitution effect in operation, suppose that
a person derives the same level of satisfaction from two goods, and that the
price of one of the goods rises. If this increase prompts the person to
consume more of the second good (which brings the same satisfaction but is
now less expensive relative to the first), the two goods are considered
substitutes. For example, if the consumer enjoys plain pizza as much as she
enjoys pizza with pepperoni, and the price of pepperoni pizza rises, her
consumption of plain pizza will increase because she will substitute the
cheaper (and equally satisfying) plain for pepperoni.45
Applied to criminal law, substitution analysis goes a step beyond
marginal deterrence (which concerned itself with different versions of
similar crimes) to ask if an enhanced penalty "for X will distort behavior
and lead people to commit an altogether different crime (Y, Z, or some
combination of the two)."46 When we shift our attention from crimes that
vary only in magnitude, the importance of substitution as a separate
consideration becomes even more clear. The goal of deterrence, after all, is
to raise the cost of committing a particular crime to the point at which a
potential law breakers will conclude that the costs outweigh the benefits.
Implicit in this model is the assumption (or hope) that the time spent on
criminal activity would be spent on other, non-criminal pursuits.
Substitution analysis recognizes that the opportunity set for potential law
breakers includes both non-criminal and criminal activity. Thus, an increase
in the penalty for one crime might deter that crime and others closely linked
to it--for example, causing a criminal to swear off theft of any kind, large
sums and small--but might encourage the commission of other unrelated
crimes like drug sales or assault.47 The goal of accounting for substitution is
Enforcement of Law, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1039, 1040 (1994) ("In [the] context
[of] marginal deterrence, stepping up enforcement against one level of
activity may induce a switch to a more harmful act instead"); see also
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 63 ("marginal deterrence can be
promoted by increasing the probability of detection as well as the magnitude
of sanctions").
45

EARL L. GRINOLS, MICROECONOMICS 130-31 (1994).
See
generally ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 109-118
(5th ed. 2003).
46

Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2385, 2391 (1997).
47

See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 63 (when a potential law
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to set penalties and enforcement strategies at a level that will cause a
decrease in all crimes, not merely displace criminal activity from one
category of crime to another.
B. The Sociology of Offending and Deterrence
Sociologists typically approach anti-social or deviant behavior with a
wider perspective. Deterrence is just one of the many theories of offending
within sociology.48 I will first sketch out some of the general trends in the
sociological or criminological approach to crime, then I will focus on
deterrence theory. This is a vast field; my goal is to provide some examples
of the richness of the sociological approach and then identify the ways that
sociology can modify the law-and-economics model to help us arrive at a
better a better approach to deterrence. This approach can be divided into
two very broad strands. One emphasizes “theories of the person,” which
focus on “enduring” individual traits that incline people to commit crimes
through their lives.49 The other strand focuses on “theories of the
environment, which attribute crime to circumstances and situations.”50
Perhaps the most influential criminological theory is Edward H.
Sutherland’s theory of differential association.51 Sutherland argued that
criminal behavior is learned, not the result of innate characteristics.52 His
breaker has a choice of several harmful acts, "the threat of sanctions plays a
role in addition to the usual one of deterring individuals from committing
harmful acts: for individuals who are not deterred, expected sanctions
influence which harmful acts individuals choose to commit").
48

For an excellent discussion of the ebb and flow of sociological
theories of offending see RONALD L. AKERS, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES:
INTRODUCTION AND EVALUATION (1999). See also John H. Laub, The Life
Course of Criminology in the United States: The American Society of
Criminology 2003 Presidential Address, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2004).
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theory focused on relationships and argued that criminal behavior is learned
“within intimate personal groups.”53 People learn both “techniques of
committing the crime” and the “motives, drives, rationalizations, and
attitudes” that encourage criminal behavior.54 He argued that people
become criminals when the influences favoring criminal activity outweigh
the influences favoring compliance with the law.55 Sutherland’s approach
opened the field to inquiries about the nature and importance of social
interactions. Ronald L. Akers’s social learning theory built on and
expanded Sutherland’s work.56 Akers’s work sought to explain the
“variables that operate both to motivate and control criminal behavior.”57
One important element of Akers’s work is that it addressed both behavior
and attitudes. He argued that when a person commits a criminal act, the
response to that act will affect his future behavior and it will affect his
“definitions,” that is, his preferences and attitudes.58 Akers’s work is also
important because it recognized the importance of a wide range of factors,
such as a person’s religious beliefs, relationships with others, mental health,
and many others.59 Another criminological theory relies on the idea of
anomie, a concept taken from the work of Emile Durkheim, referring to a
“state of normlessness or lack of social regulation.”60 Building on
Durkheim’s work, Robert Merton focused the disjunction between the goals
that most members of society hold and the means by which people can attain
those goals. Merton argued that socially-acceptable goals (like wealth or
status) are strongly reinforced, but socially-acceptable means of achieving
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.; see also AKERS, supra note 48, at 61.
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RONALD L. AKERS, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL LEARNING
APPROACH (1973).
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AKERS, supra note 48, at 63.
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RONALD L. AKERS, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL LEARNING
APPROACH 60 (3d ed. 1985).
59
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AKERS, supra note 48, at 62-67.

AKERS, supra note 48, at 119. See also EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE
(John A. Spaulding & George Simpson, Free Press 1951) (1897).
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those goals are not as well developed.61 Like Sutherland and Akers, Merton
sought to explain the forces that shape both behavior and preferences.
Deterrence theory is the closest criminological theory to a rational
choice, law-and-economics model.62 It relies on rules to deter people from
committing crimes, and does so by convincing potential law breakers that
the benefits they would gain from crime would be outweighed by the pain
they would suffer if caught.63 But when sociologists analyze deterrence
theory, they do so in a different way than economists. In the economic
model, the cost of committing a crime is the expected legal sanction.64 As I
explore more fully below, sociologists have a much broader conception of
costs. For example, they consider the effects of the way that those we care
about react to our behavior and the way that individuals react to their own
behavior (feelings of pride or guilt, for example).65 For sociologists who
study deterrence, the issue is not just whether formal sanctions do or do not
deter, but whether and how formal legal sanctions and informal social
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Robert K. Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, 3 AM. SOC. REV.
672, 677-78 (1938).
62

Although I focus on those aspects of deterrence theory that rely on
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environment, the political, economic, social and cultural contexts of
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areas.” Anthony E. Bottoms & Paul Wiles, Explanations of Crime and
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CRIMINOLOGY 31 (David J. Evans, et al., eds. 1992).
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Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence and Incapacitation, in THE
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Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model,
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sanctions combine to affect behavior.66
C. The Lessons of Theory
In the end, the differences between the law-and-economics approach and
the sociological approach are perhaps not as profound as they might first
appear. For example, there is no inherent contradiction between the
hypothesis that individuals act so as to maximize their utility and the belief
that poverty or abuse contributes to (or causes) criminal behavior. The
rationality hypothesis does not assume that people gain utility only from
socially useful activities. So some of the differences between law-andeconomics and sociology may have to do more with terminology than actual
differences in theory.
Nonetheless, some differences are meaningful to our inquiry. Most
fundamentally, the law-and-economics approach tries to explain offense
behavior as a general matter and does not attempt to explain the preferences
that individual offenders hold.67 Most law-and-economics models assume
that preferences are fixed, and that people act rationally. In addition, lawand-economics aggregates people; it is not interested in individual
differences, but in broader generalizations. These assumptions limit the
kinds of policy responses that a law-and-economics approach can support
because any policy response must be broad enough to affect a vast number
of potential offenders.68 Typically, the law-and-economics approach
66

See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the
Outset of the Twenty-First Century, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998); Bradley R.E. Wright, et al., Does
the Perceived Risk of Punishment Deter Criminally Prone Individuals?
Rational Choice, Self-Control, and Crime, 41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 180,
205-06 (2004).
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suggests only two responses to deviant behavior: changing enforcement
priorities or changing the official sanction for criminal conduct.
The sociological approach is broader in that it considers a much greater
number of ways to motivate individuals. It does not assume that preferences
are fixed; indeed, many of the policy responses recommended by
sociologists or criminologists aim to change preferences. But the broader
focus comes at the cost of making many policy responses unrealistic. It
would be wonderful to end poverty, for example, and doing so might be the
best way to reduce crime, but it is a tall order and not likely to provide
comfort to policy makers who want faster and cheaper solutions.
My goal is to try to learn from both the law-and-economics and
sociological models, and examining sex tourism in detail will help do this.
In the sections that follow, I draw lessons from both models for three main
reasons. One strength of the law-and-economics model is that it counts as
costs the factors that make it less likely that a person will commit a crime.
One weakness is that its list of costs is too often unrealistically (and
unhelpfully) undeveloped. The sociological model recognizes that every
person has a different constellation of motivations and constraints and that
different people are moved to avoid criminal behavior by different reasons.69
I therefore use the idea of costs, but expand the list of possible costs to
include more factors.
A second reason to use ideas from both models is that globalization has
changed the issues that are central to criminal behavior. For reasons that I
explain in detail below, formal sanctions are much less important than they
used to be. The basic law-and-economics model, which includes the
expected formal sanction as one of its two costs, is therefore impractical.70
The sociological model recognizes the centrality of non-formal sanctions.71
69

Some sociological models consider “constraints” on behavior that
operate much as costs do in the economic models. This approach is helpful,
but does not go far enough because it too often lists constraints that are so
idiosyncratic as to be unhelpful to policy makers.
70

There are obviously many law-and-economics scholars whose
work examines norms, and I draw on their work throughout this Article. My
point here is not to suggest that law-and-economics has ignored norms, but
to suggest that the formal law-and-economics model has not accounted for
the insights of norms scholars, and that norms are more important to
transnational activity than previously thought.
71

See, e.g., AKERS, supra note 48, at 22. Indeed, some argue that
non-formal sanctions are more important than formal sanctions. See, e.g.,

Keenan

21

Both models provide some insights into the complicated ways that nonformal sanctions can interact with formal sanctions, and I explore this issue
in detail.
Finally, as the sex tourism example makes clear, globalization has
reduced the transaction costs of crime radically. Transactions costs operated
as an uncounted but powerful constraint on criminal behavior, and their
reduction has changed the calculus of many potential offenders.72 The
sociological approach recognizes this in a way that law-and-economics does
not. Gathering information about new offenses and modifying preferences
regarding new offenses are important to any discussion of deterrence, and
the sociological model provides valuable insights on these processes.
III. DETERRENCE AND SUBSTITUTION IN THE REAL WORLD
Most deterrence policy relies on the typical economic model. When
policymakers want to attack crime, they typically see themselves as having
two levers to pull, sanctions and deployment of law enforcement resources.
Because this formulation implicitly adopts the law-and-economics model, it
is important to take a close look at the assumptions and mechanics of the
law-and-economics approach. No one who uses economic models really
thinks that they precisely predict human behavior; most models incorporate
too many simplifications and occasionally unrealistic assumptions to be
accurate. Models are useful because they help identify assumptions,
describe relationships between variables, and map a complicated transaction
in a simple, useful way. They identify the broad structure and basic
components, but they are often crude and do not fit specific situations well.
Recently there has been an attempt to introduce insights drawn from
cognitive psychology, sociology, and other disciplines to challenge, or at
least modify, the assumptions of the rational choice model.73 The goal of
these attempts is to "modify the implausible elements of rational choice
theory and supplement the inadequate elements in order to create a tool with

Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 64, at 837. Others argue that formal
sanctions are most important when they trigger non-formal sanctions. See,
e.g., Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, The Meaning of Arrest for Wife
Assault, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 163 (1989).
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more predictive power in specific situations."74
A. The Problem: Transnational Crime Requires a New Model of
Deterrence
None of this work has attempted to account for the changes brought by
globalization.75 The goal of this Article is to modify the deterrence and
substitution models to make them more powerful tools for shaping
transnational deterrence policy. I do this by adding two important and asyet unexplored refinements to the conventional model of deterrence to better
account for the complexity of transnational activity. First, I argue that
traditional deterrence models combine two variables that must be separated
and analyzed as distinct costs. Most deterrence models consider the
"probability of apprehension and conviction"76 to be a single, unitary cost.
Although this might be a rational simplifying assumption for domestic crime
(at least in the United States), it is not appropriate for a globalized world in
which unwanted activity crosses borders. This is true for two primary
reasons. To begin, the conventional model implicitly assumes that the legal
sanction is the only sanction; that the only costs imposed on people who
engage in unwanted activity are those imposed by the state. This is not the
case. Although legal sanctions are obviously important, the threat or
imposition of non-legal sanctions are also important costs, and can act as
deterrents to unwanted activity. Such sanctions could take the form of a
reduction in public reputation or esteem, or the internal guilt associated with
being associated with an accusation that the person engaged in activity that
violated social norms. Accounting for these costs in the deterrence
74
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calculation is complicated, but necessary.
The second refinement I make is to recognize that substitution or
displacement is a process, not a simple act. Briefly stated, substitution
occurs when the costs associated with an activity increase and the actor
decides either to engage in a different activity or to engage in the same
activity in a different place. Thus, if the penalty for the preferred crime rises
sharply, then an actor may substitute another activity--either a lawful
activity or a different, less-costly crime--for the preferred crime.
Conventional deterrence analysis treats substitution or displacement as a
costless transaction. As I will show, it is a complicated transaction that
carries within it substantial costs. If, for example, a sex tourist decides that
the cost of engaging in sexual activity with children has gotten too high in
the U.S., he might decide to travel to another country. The costs associated
with this move can be significant, ranging from the practical costs of
gathering information about a new place and engaging with his victims to
the losses involved with abandoning the sunk costs associated with
developing the expertise that allowed him to engage in the original behavior.
Finally, before moving on, a short explanation of why we should attend
to the possibility of substitution, and why we should do so through legal
rules (or purposeful attempts to alter norms), is in order. There are three
main reasons, one theoretical, one normative and one much more practical.
The theoretical reason is that because the entities affected by transnational
crime are widely dispersed and lack sufficient information, legal rules are
the best way to account for substitution. The normative reason is that
because substitution is often geographic, the consequences of U.S. and
European regulation are felt in other parts of the world as harms. The
practical reason is that deterrence policy should fully explore all the costs in
a criminal transaction as a way of identifying those costs that can be
increased in an effort to reduce crime.
One of the consequences of globalization is that in some instances
geography matters less than it used to. As discussed above, if the costs
associated with an activity rise in the U.S., those who wish to pursue the
activity can easily travel to another part of the world where the activity is
less expensive. Sometimes this migration is intentional. The source country
might intentionally increase the costs associated with an activity so as to
drive it out of the country, or the destination country might strategically
modify its regulations to attract the activity. When this happens in
commercial relations, it can often be a good thing. For example, some
scholars argue that regulatory competition in Europe helped to develop the
economy as leaders pursued policies to encourage commercial enterprises to
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locate in their territory rather than in a rival’s.77
Not every migration of activity is beneficent or caused by intentional
policy shifts. Sex tourism is an obvious example. When the activity
migrates not because of a purposeful modification of regulation but as an
unintended side-effect of a policy, it is helpful to think of the migration as
an externality. In economic terms, an externality occurs when “production
or consumption activities involve benefits or costs that fall on people not
directly involved in the activities.”78 The problem is that because the costs
of the activity are not paid by those considering whether to engage in it,
there is a chance that there will be too much or too little of the activity.79
Put another way, if one goal of deterrence policy is to decrease the incidence
of undesirable behavior, not merely to move it from one place to another, we
must look at the effects of regulation not just in the place where the
regulation is imposed, but elsewhere as well. This poses a fundamental
problem, because “it will be socially desirable for individuals to engage less
often in acts that cause detrimental effects than is in their immediate selfinterest.”80 To analogize this to the sex tourism example,81 when countries
that are able to effectively regulate illicit sexual behavior do so (out of their
immediate self-interest, of course), they cause harm in the developing world.
Economists recognize that the best way to account for externalities is for
the parties involved to communicate with each other and arrive at a
mutually-beneficial agreement.82 They also recognize that there are often
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significant impediments to this process.83 There are a number of reasons
why such communication may not occur. Among the reasons are that it is
difficult or impractical for parties to communicate, that the number of
entities with an interest in the situation is so high that bargaining is difficult,
that the party causing the harm does not recognize the harm (or that the
party suffering the harm does not know where it came from), or that
everyone knows from the beginning that any discussions are likely to fail.84
Considered through the lens of the sex tourism example, it is clear that
activity that crosses borders is susceptible to many of these impediments to
bargaining. There are many interested parties spread around the globe and
many of them do not have adequate information about the consequences of
their activity or the sources of the harm that befalls them. It is in situations
like this, in which bargaining is unlikely to occur and, if it does happen,
unlikely to succeed, that economists recommend legal rules as a way alter
undesirable or sub-optimal behavior. To summarize this point--the
theoretical reason that we should account for substitution through legal rules
is because sex tourist source countries (and, in the U.S., the states) and
destination countries are unable to efficiently negotiate, and because neither
side has the necessary information, displacement should be addressed
through changes to legal rules or purposeful attempts to change norms,
rather than leaving it to the affected parties to work out.
The normative reason that we should attend to substitution is much
easier to state: those who cause harm should pay for it. This normative
version of the economic argument that actors should seek to account for
externalities has a long pedigree. Lord Bramwell, the 19th Century English
jurist, famously wrote that “It is for the public benefit that trains should run;
but not unless they pay their expenses.”85 He argued that the costs of a
public benefit should be borne by those who enjoy the benefits, not by
individuals without compensation.86 The economic case thus focuses on
supply; if the true costs of an activity are not borne by those who benefit
from it but instead shifted to someone else, the beneficiaries will engage in
too much of it. The normative argument is simpler: it is fundamentally
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unfair for one party to force another to pay for the first party’s pleasure.
There are a couple of practical reasons that we should pay attention to
substitution. The first is what some refer to as “blowback,” purportedly “a
CIA term of art for the unintended, even ironic consequences of intelligence
operations.”87 Blowback refers to the risk that policy measures that attempt
to fix one problem can create another. The most commonly-cited example
comes from events that followed the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
During the occupation, the U.S. provided arms to Osama bin Laden and his
allies to fight the Soviets. After the occupation, bin Laden and his allies
used those same weapons against U.S. forces and interests.88 The point is
that policies, even those intended to do good, can cause unanticipated harm,
and that self interest (apart from any concern for those affected by the
policies) should compel us to consider those harms.
A second practical reason to consider substitution is that it can help
reduce unwanted behavior. By definition, those who substitute out of their
preferred activity to another activity have been at least partially deterred.
Some substitute into desirable activities and some into unwanted activities.
Those who go to new undesirable activities are forced to give up valuable
expertise, making them vulnerable to detection. Thus even if policies result
in substitution, they can still be effective. Accounting for substitution is a
way to make policies more effective by attempting to predict the quantity
and direction of substitution. Imagine that the U.S. government clamps
down on illicit sexual activity. Some of those who engaged in the activity
decide to quit and do something else. Some decide to try to find the same
activity in another location. The nations affected, either as the source of
those who wish to engage in the activity or their likely destination, would
surely like to be able to predict where those who were not completely
deterred were likely to go, and which of them was likely to travel. This
information could lead to better coordination and widen the reach of law
enforcement to capture more of the unwanted activity. Accounting for
displacement does not mean avoiding it at all costs; instead, it means
recognizing that it can occur and taking additional steps to capture some of
the displaced activity.
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B. Displacement: Sex Tourism and Other Real-World Examples
Researchers and law enforcement officials have long recognized the
potential for displacement. Displacement comes in many forms, but all
occur when some kind of enforcement action prevents a potential offender
from doing what he wants, when he wants, where he wants, and in the way
he wants.89 Displacement can be geographic, in which case criminal activity
is driven from one place to another; “tactical,” in which case the criminal
changes methods but not crimes; or substantial, in which case the offender
changes crimes entirely.90 There is evidence suggesting that geographic
displacement can occur. For example, when the police crack down on a
drug market in one neighborhood, sellers may move to an adjacent
neighborhood.91 There is also evidence regarding substantial displacement;
that is, the risk that offenders may switch from one crime to another. The
evidence on this issue is complicated. For example, a population of
offenders whose preferred crime was credit card fraud encountered new
technologies that should have made it profitable for them to switch to a
related crime.92 They did not do so, for at least two reasons. First, the
payoff from the new crime, even with the new technology, was simply not
high enough to justify the switch.93 Second, the second crime was tightly
controlled by an ethnically-defined criminal syndicate, which did not permit
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members of other ethnic groups to engage in the activity.94
These two real-world examples of displacement are helpful for several
reasons. First, they demonstrate that displacement can, under certain
conditions occur. Second, they demonstrate that demand can be stronger
than enforcement efforts; in other words, if demand is sufficiently inelastic,
then displacement is more likely than if demand is very sensitive to
increases in price. Third, displacement can actually increase harm if it
forces criminals into a new location, one where law enforcement officials
are not prepared to combat the new crime and where social rules against the
activity are not sufficiently strong to prevent the creation of a new group of
consumers. Finally, they show that displacement is both complicated and
difficult. It is not the costless transaction that some law-and-economics
theorists seem to assume, and it can be disrupted in some cases.
Other areas of criminal behavior have also exhibited what looks like a
substitution effect. One useful example is international terrorism, which has
long been a transnational phenomenon, making it perhaps the closest
analogy to sex tourism. The modern history of terrorist activity shows that
differences in the effectiveness of regulation have caused terrorists to
migrate to the areas of lowest regulation.95 There is evidence, for example,
that “the installation of metal detectors in airports” that began in 1973 “had
primarily a substitution effect” because the policy made airplane hijackings
more difficult, but encouraged terrorists to substitute into other kinds of
terrorist activities.96
One reason for the substitution was that, although the change in policy
that caused substitution drove up the cost of one kind of terrorist act, it did
not affect the "resources, knowledge, or wherewithal"97 of those wishing to
engage in terrorist acts. Terrorists still had the desire and means to engage
in terrorism even if their preferred venue was no longer available.
Researchers concluded that in the case of terrorism an effective policy
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intervention must "increase the cost of all terrorist modes of operation
simultaneously."98 An effective deterrent must not only disrupt the specific
activity, it must also disrupt its component parts.
Finally, there is evidence that sex tourism is an example of
displacement. There has been a substantial increase in prosecutions for
illicit sexual activity in the United States, and a corresponding decrease in
the number of reported victims of such crimes. Taken alone, this evidence
tells a welcome story for the U.S. But when considered in light of the other
evidence I present, the story becomes more complicated. Effective
regulation in the U.S. may lead to substitution or displacement, encouraging
those who want to engage in the activity to seek other venues. In economic
terms, this means that the cost of the activity has risen in the U.S. and has
led those who wish to engage in it to seek less expensive alternatives.
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One piece of the evidence comes from statistics showing that
prosecutions for similar crimes in the U.S. have increased. Prosecutions in
U.S. District Courts of cases involving the sexual exploitation of children
rose every year between 1994 and 2002. The first table below shows the
number of prosecutions for the sexual exploitation of children.99 Table 2
shows the increase in prosecutions for the transportation of minors (and
others) for sexual purposes.100 Both tables show a sharp increase in
prosecutions in the past decade. Neither table is a perfect measure of the
behavior that underlies sex tourism, but taken together they support the
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inference that the sexual activity that underlies much of sex tourism is
increasingly effectively regulated in the U.S.
Tables 1 and 2 reflect prosecutions in federal court. But the majority of
sex offenses, like all criminal cases, are prosecuted in state courts.101 When
we examine state records, there is a looser fit between the available evidence
and the argument that effective regulation has displaced the activity, but
there is support for the point. Between 1991 and 2001, the number of
reported rapes declined 26%.102 The victimization rate for children under
twelve fell approximately 71% in the same period.103 During this time, the
victimization rate for all victims, including those under 12, fell
approximately 42%. Again the data are not perfect, but the fact that there
are fewer victims of sexual assault, and fewer child victims of all crimes,
supports the inference that the behavior that underlies sex tourism has
decreased in the U.S.
There is strong anecdotal evidence to support this inference. Two recent
reports, "The Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Cases," written in 2001 for the
U.S. Department of Justice,104 and "Sexual Abuse Decline in the 1990s:
Evidence for Possible Causes,"105 produced for the Crimes against Children
Research Center at the University of New Hampshire, both draw on
evidence from a variety of sources that points to a sharp decrease in sexual
abuse of children in the U.S. in the past decade. Although the authors
disagree about the reasons for the decline, they conclude that the evidence
indicates that there has been decline of approximately 39%.106
Taken together, evidence of a significant increase in prosecutions for
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sexual abuse crimes, and a significant decrease in the number of reported
victims of such abuse suggest that the cost in terms of likely prosecution has
increased and may have contributed to the corresponding decline in the
incidence of the behavior, at least in the U.S. This evidence does not,
however, tell us anything about whether the activity has declined overall or
has been displaced from the U.S. to other countries.
Displacement of illicit sexual activity can occur only if individuals can
travel cheaply to common destination countries. A study of changes in
travel patterns between Europe and the U.S. and common destination
countries reveals helpful but not conclusive evidence. As shown in Table 3,
between 1995 and 1999, there was a significant increase in travel from
Europe and the Americas107 to three common sex tourism destination
countries.108

Percentage Increase in Tourists Arriving Between 1995 and 1999

Cambodia

Philippines

Thailand

Europe

36.37%

26.78%

21.26%

Americas

38.89%

21.09%

30.49%

In addition, there is reason to believe that the statistics do not capture the
entire increase. Although the numbers show an increase in travel from
source countries to destination countries, they do not show the proportion of
sex tourists to business travelers and ordinary vacationers. But there is
anecdotal evidence that as a location gains a reputation as a sex tour
destination, ordinary tourists begin to stay away.109 Thus the percentage
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increase in sex tourists is likely higher than the increase in total tourists to
destination countries because as the number of sex tourists rises, the
concentration of sex tourists increases even more.
C. Discovery, Prosecution, and Sanctions
Whether a person is deterred from committing a crime depends in great
measure on what he thinks will happen after the crime. How much will he
benefit from the crime? How likely is it that he will be caught? If he is
caught, then what--will he be embarrassed, praised, prosecuted? If he is
prosecuted, what will the sanction be? This complicated calculation must,
of course, be simplified in any economic model. Most scholars follow the
lead of Gary Becker, who treated the probability of apprehension and
conviction as a single variable, and assumed that "only convicted offenders
are punished."110 The two steps--first apprehension, then conviction--are
not separated. Although this might be a reasonable simplifying assumption
in the U.S.,111 it is unreasonable with respect to transnational activity, where
it is not at all clear that apprehension will be followed by conviction or
social disapprobation.112 Any deterrence model that leaves out the role of
“because of the sleazy reputations of its cities.” LINDA K. RICHTER, THE
POLITICS OF TOURISM IN ASIA 100 (1989). See also Donna Tunney, Travel's
Dirty Little Secret, 60 TRAVEL WKLY. 38, Aug. 6, 2001 (describing
reluctance of ordinary tourists to return to location at which other tourists
engaged in lascivious behavior). From the vantage of many potential sex
tourists, once a destination “tips” toward sex tourism and fewer legitimate
tourists arrive, the destination might be even more attractive. For individual
offenders, the expected payoff for a crime is higher if other people also
commit the same offense in the same location and thereby tax police
resources. See Peter-J. Jost, Crime, Coordination and Punishment: An
Economic Analysis, 21 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 23, 25 (2001).
110

Becker, supra note 33, at 177.

111

In state courts (which handle the vast majority of criminal cases),
60% of suspects arrested for homicide are convicted, and 94% of those are
sent to prison. For rape, 45% of those arrested are convicted and 70% go to
prison. For robbery, 44% of those arrested are convicted, and 75% go to
prison. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 102, at 89
(2002).
112

See, e.g., Cathy Scott-Clark & Adrian Levy, The Brothel King's
Revenge, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 21, 2004 (owner of largest sex club in

The New Deterrence

34

social norms in governing personal behavior is inadequate. In this section I
attempt to consider more fully the range of costs facing a potential criminal.
Deterrence analysis that follows the law-and-economics model holds
that if the benefit of an illegal activity outweighs the likelihood of detection
and the expected legal sanction, then a person will choose to commit the
crime. In this model, the only cost to the potential lawbreaker is the
expected legal sanction (as modified by the probability of detection). This
simple model leaves out the important role of social norms. Norms are
"informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because
of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal
sanctions, or both."113 There is much debate about how norms emerge-from a person's desire to signal to others that she is a worthy partner for
future interaction,114 from a desire for the esteem of others,115 or from an
internalized understanding that cooperation is best so long as others also
cooperate.116 There is, of course, a complicated relationship between norms
and the law. Some argue that one important function of the law is
"expressive:" by adding the voice of the state on the side of an existing
social norm, the law can create or strengthen the norm (or weaken the norm
by contradicting it).117 Others argue that the law is, in many circumstances,
made much less relevant by the existence of well-known, efficient norms.118
Bangkok reporting that he had paid bribes to the police of at least £1.5
million); PASUK PHONGPAICHIT ET AL., CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
IN THAILAND: PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCE OF HOUSEHOLDS 37 (2000)
(indicating that the police solicited bribes from 9% of visitors); Nualnoi
Teerat,
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against
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(2004),
at
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2004).
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Despite the variety of approaches in the norms literature, what is clear is that
norms matter to law, and that if they are consistent with the law, they can
supplement the law's deterrent power.
Given the connection between norms and the law, and particularly
between norms and deterrence, it is strange that norms are not considered
more central to the deterrence model. To be sure, there is much discussion
of the role of norms in deterrence,119 but this discussion mostly focuses on
the role of norms as independent mechanisms to deter crime. What is left
out is a consideration of norms as an element of the deterrence model.120
Because engaging in behavior that would violate an internalized norm raises
the cost of unwanted activity, the violation of norms should be included as a
cost in the deterrence model.
Despite the literature linking law and norms, the implicit assumption
often seems to be that, for people willing to commit one crime, all other
crimes are, in effect, moral substitutes. That is, that apart from differences in
penalty or likelihood of enforcement, a person willing to commit theft
would also be willing to commit rape. Underlying this assumption is the
belief that people either are or are not criminals. If a person is a criminal,
then he must not be influenced at all by positive social norms (those against
committing crimes) or he must be exclusively influenced by negative social
norms (those that encourage or excuse criminal behavior).121 Put another
way, the law-and-economics approach assumes that "[i]f the thief has his

SETTLE DISPUTES (1991)
119
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hand cut off for taking five dollars, he has just as well take $5,000."122 The
assumption that people who are willing to commit a particular crime are
immune to all norms is at odds with human behavior. A thief who is willing
to steal five dollars might not steal $5000--regardless of the penalty-because he, like many people, had internalized the idea that there are
degrees of wrong. In other words, he might have been willing to violate a
norm against stealing a small amount of money, but still be unwilling to
violate a different norm against stealing a much larger amount.
Criminologists have begun to investigate this insight. In addition to
weighing formal sanctions, those who are considering criminal activity also
weigh the informal sanctions that might flow from their behavior.
Criminologists focus on two informal costs, the “shame for doing something
the actor considers morally wrong,”123 and “social censure or disapproval by
significant others.”124 Both have the potential to shape behavior and
encourage or discourage compliance with the law.125 The research suggests
that all potential costs work together much in the way that the law-andeconomics model would suggest, but that the equation is complicated. The
evidence supports the hypothesis that people considering whether to commit
a criminal act do engage in the kind of weighing of costs and benefits that
Gary Becker suggested in his groundbreaking work.126 But the evidence
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also suggests that people include the costs associated with informal
sanctions in the calculation along with the costs associated with formal
sanctions.127 Interestingly, the research also suggests that informal sanctions
influence the importance of formal sanctions.128 Thus informal sanctions
operate as both “a powerful and independent source of social control, they
also condition the impact of more rational factors,” which include formal
legal sanctions.129 In some circumstances, internal moral rules can trump
more practical considerations (such as the likelihood of detection or the
likely legal sanction). In other circumstances, where moral rules exert less
influence, utility calculations are more important.130
An important subsidiary consideration is the potential offender’s
perception of the risk of suffering a sanction for his misbehavior. In other
words, costs influence behavior only if potential offenders are aware of
them. The evidence suggests that “people who perceive that sanction risks
and costs are higher” commit fewer crimes.131 But recognizing this fact is
just the beginning of the analysis. More important is to consider whether
“the perceptions are themselves manipulable by policy.”132 The task then is
to construct policies that can influence a potential law breaker’s perception
of how likely he is to be caught, and what the likely sanctions for his
misbehavior will be. Some of the difficulty of this task is explained by the
status and community issues discussed below. When potential law breakers
receive signals that their conduct is common and unlikely to result in a
sanction, they are more likely to engage in the conduct.133 But the first step
in setting effective policies is to recognize what they must accomplish and
the multitude of approaches that they should take.
The decision to commit a crime is complicated, and influenced by many
factors, among them the probability of being caught, the expected legal
180, 205-06 (2004); Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 65, at 579.
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sanction, the probability of actually suffering the legal sanction, and social
norms. Norms against committing a crime must be stacked next to the other
reasons that person might commit a crime. It is wrong to assume that
persons who have decided to commit a crime are not influenced by positive
norms. They may not be completely deterred by the norm, but they are as
likely to be influenced by a positive norm as any other person. In economic
terms, the decision to violate a norm is a cost--perhaps substantial, perhaps
negligible--that must be accounted for in the economic deterrence model.
Depending upon who discovers the suspect, apprehension (or discovery),
can subject the person to significant social sanctions like loss of reputation,
ostracism, or disruptions to family or employment dynamics. The
likelihood of suffering these sanctions is surely a consideration for a person
weighing whether to commit a transnational crime. Whether this cost is
high or low depends in large part on the extent to which the suspect is
connected to the community in which he is apprehended.
Assume, for example, that a sex tourist is caught with a child prostitute
in a remote resort in Thailand. If he is not prosecuted, he might suffer some
personal embarrassment and the opprobrium of the people who caught him.
But the cost to his reputation at home--the reputation he cares most about-will be low because there is no mechanism for people in the sex tourism
destination country to affect his reputation at home. A second type of cost is
one that sex tourists certainly consider, and that is the monetary cost
associated with avoiding prosecution. This assumes that the entity that
apprehended the suspect has the capacity to initiate legal proceedings (or
credibly threaten to do so). It is clear that sex tourists not only pay bribes,
they exchange information about the amount they should pay.134
It is useful at this juncture to recall that the purpose of developing an
economic model of deterrence is to identify the costs associated with
unwanted activity. The costs are those elements that make the activity less
desirable, more difficult, or more risky. Because the threat of apprehension
and the threat of prosecution are different factors, and because both are
substantial risks for those contemplating transnational crimes, they should
be separately included in the deterrence model.
D. The Substitution Process
Some models of deterrence account for substitution; that is, they account
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for the prospect that increasing the costs associated with committing one
crime will decrease the incidence of that crime but provide an incentive to
commit other crimes. Most models of deterrence assume that individuals
make a simple calculation: if the benefits of committing a crime outweigh
the costs, calculated as the probability of detection and the expected legal
sanction, then a rational criminal will commit the crime. Substitution
models combine the simple deterrence calculation with the assumption that
a criminal has the opportunity to commit more than one crime, and that the
penalty for one crime has increased. Thus, if the benefits of committing the
second crime (reduced, of course, by the costs outlined above) outweigh the
benefits of committing the first crime (reduced by a similar factor), then a
rational criminal will commit the second crime. An increase in the cost of
committing the preferred crime (either an increase in enforcement or an
increase in penalty, or a combination of both), can lead a criminal to
substitute a second, less costly, crime for the first.
In the deterrence literature that considers the substitution effect,
substitution is treated as a simple, costless decision:135 if, for example, the
cost of dealing crack increases (through higher penalties or more vigorous
enforcement), then a drug dealer will simply sell heroin. Even crimes that
might not appear closely related--like rape, assault, prostitution, or murder-are treated as potential substitutes for each other, under the right
conditions.136 Treating substitution as an event rather than a process ignores
the many potential costs contained in it, any one of which could be a point
of regulation.
One important set of costs associated with the process of substitution are
those incurred during the transition from one form of unwanted activity to
another. Again, most models of deterrence assume that substitution from
one form of unwanted activity is costless. While this might be an
appropriate simplifying assumption with regard to closely linked offenses
like dealing different kinds of drugs, it is out of place when discussing any
kind of activity in which substitution is more complicated than that.
Gathering information, particularly about transnational activity, can be
very costly. Recall that in the deterrence model, costs are those factors that
make the activity less appealing, thereby reducing the net expected value of
the benefit and making it less likely that a person will engage in the activity.
Let us consider a common example from the deterrence literature, that of a
135
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drug dealer who learns that the penalty for dealing crack has increased.137
The conventional models predict that a dealer faced with this problem will
survey the legal landscape, determine that the penalty for dealing heroin is
less severe than that for dealing crack (and, to keep things simple, that the
probability of detection is the same). She will then begin to sell heroin.
The model's assumption is again at odds with human behavior. Making
the shift from selling one illegal drug to another is likely fraught with risks,
some of which may be high enough to deter the shift (especially when
combined with all the other costs). Even in this simple example, the
potential costs are clear enough. First, like all retailers, drug dealers must
identify suppliers for their goods. It is safe to assume (especially with
regard to illegal activity) that there is no ready list of potential suppliers.
Second, drug dealers must identify new customers (even if we assume that
drug dealers are indifferent to what they sell, there is ample evidence that
drug users have strong preferences). Finally, drug dealers, like all retailers,
succeed or fail based in some part on their reputations. All of this activity-finding a supplier, identifying customers, establishing a brand--is likely to
draw the attention of existing heroin dealers, with significant attendant risks.
And a novice heroin dealer is more likely to be caught by law enforcement
than an experienced crack dealer.
E. Investments and Sunk Costs
In economic terms, sunk costs are “costs that cannot be altered or
avoided by current or future decisions.”138 These can include past
investments in infrastructure (whether wise or unwise), consumer goods,
real estate--virtually any past expenditure or investment that cannot be
altered. Because sunk costs cannot be altered, mainstream economics
considers them irrelevant to decision making; a rational decision maker will
ignore that which she cannot change.139 She may no longer think that her
previous decision was wise, but she should not consider sunk costs in her
future decisions. There are two other ways to state the assumption that
rational decision makers will ignore sunk costs. One is to say that the
amount we paid for a good is irrelevant to future decisions we make about it.
The other is to say that, for the purpose of making future decisions, we
should not care whether we received a good for free or if we paid for it; we
137
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should treat both goods the same. Consider an example. Assume that two
consumers obtain identical pairs of shoes. One paid $200 for them and one
got them for free. Both find the shoes very uncomfortable to wear. The
rational choice model predicts that the consumer who paid $200 for the
shoes will be as likely to give them away as the consumer who got them for
free. But our intuition tells us that the person who paid $200 is more likely
to walk around in pain or even invest more money in stretching the shoes
than the person who got them for free.140
It is by now widely accepted that this assumption does not accurately
reflect actual decision making.141 Richard Thaler’s work on sunk costs has
demonstrated that actual consumers do not behave as rationally as
economists would predict.142 In one experiment, he advertised an all-youcan-eat lunch at a local pizza restaurant. He collected an admission price
from every customer on the way in, then refunded the admission price to
half the customers, selected at random. Rational choice theory would
predict that the amount of pizza consumed by those who paid would be the
same (or nearly so) as the amount eaten by those who were enjoying a free
lunch. Reality was different. Customers who received a refund ate less than
those who had paid for their food.143 There is, of course, no way to know
for certain why those who ate more did so. One possibility is that those who
paid felt a need to justify their investment.144 Another possibility is that
those who ate less became less engaged in the process of eating because of
the refund. In either event, Thaler’s work shows that when making future
decisions, those who have invested in a good tend, on average, to value it
more highly than those who got the same good for free.
1. Investments in Expertise
Despite their general acceptance in the world of economics, Thaler’s
insights have not made its way into the law-and-economics deterrence
literature. To see the importance of Thaler’s work to criminal deterrence, it
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is first necessary to define the elements of criminal behavior that constitute
an investment. The decision to substitute one activity for another means
abandoning substantial expertise and assuming the role of novice. For most
potential offenders, expertise is their most important investment. Consider
the crack/heroin example. A successful crack dealer--that is, one who has
not been run off by other dealers nor confined in prison--has accumulated a
degree of expertise that allows him to avoid detection. For example, he can
likely tell an undercover officer from an actual customer or determine when
a rival dealer's threats are bluffs and when they pose a real danger. Potential
sex tourists will have different expertise, but it is likely to be just as
important to them as to anyone else. Potential sex tourists need to know
how to negotiate with procurers of prostitutes, how to negotiate bribes with
law enforcement officials, and how to shield their proclivities from their
friends and acquaintances.
Potential offenders can obtain expertise in two main ways. They can
learn through experience, or they can learn from others engaged in the same
activity. Developing expertise through experience is costly. For drug
dealers, it might involve harassment or violence from rival dealers,
unwanted attention from the police, time spent engaging in the low-paying
and low-status aspects of the business, or time in prison. For sex tourists,
the costs are similar, and are likely to be higher for novices than repeat
tourists. They might involve incurring the costs associated with the
uncertainty and fear of being caught by (and having to negotiate a bribe
with) a foreign police officer, being ripped off by a tour guide or procurer,
or ending up in a foreign jail.
The tools of globalization--mainly the Internet, which offers anonymous,
asynchronous communication--also offer offenders a way to obtain expertise
at almost no cost. For sex tourists, this means that they need not personally
expose themselves to the risks associated with being a novice. They can
obtain the information they need to develop expertise from others who have
gone before them. Expertise developed in this way comes at a much lower
price than expertise gained through bitter experience.145
Rational choice theory assumes that offenders are indifferent to the way
that they gained expertise; because it is a sunk cost that cannot now be
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altered, it should not influence future decision making. The rational choice
model would predict that when potential offenders consider what kind of
offense to commit--sell crack or sell heroin, for example--they are
indifferent to the amount of their investment in expertise. They should only
consider the utility they expect to gain from selling heroin versus that they
would obtain selling crack, and the cost of each. This assumption is
embedded in the law-and-economics criminal deterrence literature on the
substitution effect. The substitution effect assumes that criminals freely
switch between types of crimes, disregarding (as rational decision makers
should) the investments they have made in gaining expertise.
The work of Thaler and others tells us that this is not an accurate
description of actual behavior. The extent of investment in a particular good
affects the decisions that people make about the good. For example, Barry
Staw has shown that people are more likely to invest in a losing activity
when they have already invested in it.146 In other words, good money does
follow bad, and the extent of the previous investment helps to determine
how much good money will follow the bad money. Thaler’s own work
shows that people who obtain something for free are more likely to abandon
it if it becomes associated with a higher cost in the future. His pizza
experiment is the most prominent example of this.147 One possible reason
for this comes from a famous experiment by Elliot Aronson and Judson
Mills. They demonstrated that subjects who were forced to undergo a
burdensome and unpleasant process as the price of admission to an activity
tended to enjoy the activity more than those who had been admitted at a
lower cost or for free.148
The importance of gaining expertise or entry into a particular criminal
activity has important ramifications for understanding the deterrence of
transnational crimes. Typical approaches to deterrence, which contain most
of the assumptions of the law-and-economics model, assume that if
substitution occurs, it is a simple and costless transaction. For the reasons
developed above, I argue that this is not so. By identifying the main points
in the substitution process we can drive up the cost of the entire process and
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deter more people. The next question is one to which this section is
addressed: among potential offenders, which are likely to seek a substitute
and which are not likely to do so? Because we know that for most people,
sunk costs are relevant to decision making, we should expect that criminals
who obtain their expertise for free would be more likely to seek substitutes
than those who learn through experience. We would predict that those with
the smallest sunk costs would be the most likely to seek a substitute because
they have the least to lose from abandoning their previous activity.149 Recall
also that for deterrence, substitution is a good thing. Everyone who
substitutes a new activity for a preferred activity has, by definition,
abandoned the first activity. And some of those who abandon the first
activity substitute to activities that are lawful or socially positive.
Returning to the sex tourism example helps to illustrate the point. There
are actually two groups of people we want to deter. The first group consists
of those who engage in illicit sexual activity in the U.S. or Europe, have
noticed that the costs associated with this activity are rising, and are
considering whether to substitute sex tourism for their preferred activity.
The second group are those who have already engaged in sex tourism and
are considering whether to do it again. Assume that both pools of people
are divided into two groups, those who are willing to try their luck with little
guidance, and those who seek information about the activity on the Internet.
Deterrence policy should try to channel as many people into the second
category as possible (and to intervene in the information exchange process
to dissuade people from engaging in sex tourism). Because they have
invested the least, these people are the most likely to be willing to abandon
their investment and choose another activity for their substitute. Another
component of a strategy targeting those seeking to acquire expertise on the
cheap should be to target tour companies and travel agencies that arrange
sex tours. Such companies provide expertise for a fee, and work with the
tourists who are most likely to abandon the activity. Another component of
this strategy should be to focus on novices (regardless of how they seek to
acquire expertise). Because those with the smallest investments are the
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most likely to abandon them, novices are likely to be the easiest to deter or
detect.150
2. Sunk Costs and Norms
The idea of sunk costs is important in another way. As developed more
fully above, I argue that the conventional deterrence models leave out the
costs associated with violating the internalized norms that are likely present
in all people, even those who break the law. Including the cost of
overcoming norms might change the calculation in particular cases, and is
important because it highlights the essential role of norms, but it does not
change the structure of the model significantly. The weakness of the model
is that it assumes that substitution is a simple decision that can be made
quickly and easily. It assumes that substitution is costless when there is
good reason to believe that the process is (or could be made) very costly.
These models ignore an important insight from the norms literature.
Although there are surely general norms encouraging or supporting lawabiding behavior or good citizenship, norms are also individual and specific.
So, for example, there are separate norms regarding the use or sale of crack
versus the use or sale of heroin; separate norms against rape and against
assault, and so on.151 It is a mistake to assume that once an individual has
decided to commit one crime (thereby violating a particular norm) he would
be equally willing to commit another crime (thus violating a separate norm).
150
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As discussed above, violating an internalized norm is a cost that should be
explicitly included in any deterrence model. And each separate act involves
the violation of a separate norm. Thus, once a person has decided to violate
an internalized norm against selling crack and actually begun to sell the
drug, he has made a specific investment--paid a cost that might bring
benefits, but that might not transfer to other enterprises--that is specific to
crack dealing.
Including this insight in the model makes substitution costlier: once a
criminal has incurred the sunk cost involved with selling crack, before he
will begin to sell heroin, he must incur two costs. First, he must abandon his
investment in selling crack. Abandoning this investment--which is, in my
model, a violation of an internalized norm--will likely not be perceived as an
exorbitant cost, but might be a cost nonetheless. Second, he must be willing
to incur the cost of selling heroin. This cost could be negligible or very
high, depending on the individual's personal attachment to the norms
associated with the activity. Because committing new criminal offenses
likely involves incurring the cost of violating norms, substitution should be
viewed as an important point at which the criminal enterprise must be "recapitalized." As such it is an opportunity to turn away from the unwanted
activity, not, as is often assumed, an automatic gateway into new and
potentially more serious unwanted activity. And because it is a moment of
vulnerability for potential offenders, it is also an important juncture for
policymakers to focus on.
IV. STATUS AND INFLUENCE
As transnational activity has increased, one factor that has taken on
greater importance in deterrence policy is status. By this I mean the relative
social status of the person who engages in unwanted activity, the social
status of his victim, and the status accorded those who attempt to regulate
the activity. Among legal scholars, the issue of status is rarely given serious
consideration. When it is considered, it is typically in the context of
attempting to explain the difference in sentences given to white collar
criminals versus perpetrators of other crimes.152 There is a rich body of
behavioral science literature on importance of status that has not yet been
applied to transnational criminal activity.
For transnational activity, status is relevant in at least three ways, all of
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which relate to the creation, maintenance, and vitality of norms.153 The first
reason that status matters is that higher status can make norms much more
difficult to enforce.154 Norms are enforced in a variety of ways, but all
informal enforcement mechanisms--that is, those that do not rely directly on
the intervention of law enforcement agents--work by affecting the offender’s
reputation. This can take the form of gossip about the offender that causes
the community to reduce the esteem it accords her, criticism of the offender
that has the same effect,155 or internal self-judgment that causes the offender
to feel guilty or otherwise reduces the esteem she accords herself.156 This
mechanism relies on the victims or observers of the norms violation being
able to affect the offender’s esteem. When the victim and the offender are
not part of the same esteem “market,” either because the offender’s social
status makes him immune to the criticism of his social lessers or because the
offender is from another country and is literally absent from the locale after
the activity takes place, the offender’s reputation is beyond the reach of the
people affected by his behavior. This leaves local observers with two
choices: they tolerate the behavior or they identify or develop other
mechanisms to enforce the norms. Either way, status affects the vitality and
enforcement of norms.
A second reason is that because the behavior of people with high status
can come to symbolize their status, the actions of high-status people can
inspire others to emulate them. The symbols of status can include tangible
indicia of wealth, like designer clothes or expensive cars, consumptive
behaviors, like smoking different cigarettes or engaging in sex with
prostitutes, or assertive behavior, like adopting a particular political or
cultural attitude. In this way the activities of foreign tourists can act as
signals to poor people who wish to increase their status that those activities
symbolize high status. When the symbols of status are themselves illegal,
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the norms that regulated the unwanted activity are undermined.
The final reason that status matters is that it can distort the very process
of judgment. There are two aspects to this argument. First, behavioral
science research has shown that the actions of those with high status are
judged less harshly than the actions of those with lower status. Put another
way, actions that would be considered a violation of norms if engaged in by
a person of low status are not judged to be a violation if engaged in by a
person of high status. The boundary for appropriate behavior is different for
people with high status than for other people, which can also undermine the
norms that regulate unwanted activity. The second component of the
distortion argument relates to the way that observers judge the actions of
people with whom they are not familiar. When people observe others
engaging in inappropriate behavior, they judge it harshly at first, then
become less severe in their reactions. This happens because the initial harsh
judgment is based on two factors: that the activity was unwanted or
inappropriate, and that it was unexpected. As the activity becomes routine,
the expectations of observers are lowered, and they tolerate behavior that
they would have earlier condemned.
A. Status Affects the Maintenance of Norms
Scholars disagree on the precise mechanism by which social norms are
maintained, but there is broad agreement that disapproval is at the heart of
the process.157 People might sanction those who violate norms by talking to
others in the community about the violator, thereby reducing the social
standing of the violator.158 People might sanction norms violations by
confronting the violator directly and expressing that the observer now holds
a lower opinion of the violator than before.159 People can sanction norms
157
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violations by refusing to cooperate with the violator in the future,160 even in
the absence of gossip or a direct confrontation. In addition to the sanctions
imposed by others, norms can be maintained by internal sanctions. A
person who accepts the validity of a norm and nonetheless violates the norm
might see his self-esteem erode.161 All of these mechanisms rely on the fact
that the people want (or need for some functional reason) to feel that others
approve of them and that they approve of themselves.
Norms do not function everywhere; only where certain conditions are
present do norms come into existence and continue to function. Norms rely
on information and connection to retain their vitality. Members of the
community must have information about the content of norms162 and the
actions of others to set the size of a sanction and to properly target it. There
must also be strong connections among the individuals; those who follow
norms must care enough about what others in the community think of them
to modify their behavior.163 Caring about the opinions of others can take
many forms. It can mean a desire for approval, a desire to avoid
disapproval, or a desire to be perceived as a reliable and worthwhile partner
for business, social, or other exchanges.
A complicating factor is the possibility that people who find the
prevailing norms not to their liking will exit the “norm community.”164
When this happens, norms lose their power to regulate behavior. It is just
this situation that prevails when unwanted activity crosses borders and is
facilitated by the processes of globalization. Despite the claims of many
that globalization has brought the world closer together, in many ways the
opposite is true. Largely because of the Internet, new communities abound.
Traditional communities, because they were defined mostly by geography,
included people of a variety of interests. On the Internet, new communities
include people who may share only one interest. To be sure, specialized
communities are not new, but as a general matter, it is clear that the Internet
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has provided a forum for communities united only by a narrow interest.
Such narrow communities are not necessarily bad--one can imagine
communities devoted to backgammon or quilting--but they can also be
havens for individuals whose preferences put them at odds with the
geographic community in which they live or the larger society.
One of the benefits of a traditional community was that it typically
subjected individuals within it to a range of influences and exposed people
to a range of behaviors. From this range of activity, individuals developed
perceptions about what constituted appropriate or inappropriate behavior,
the frequency of inappropriate or illegal behavior, and the sanction for such
misbehavior. In such a community, it is possible--indeed, in some cases
likely--that the influence of the community would run counter to an
individual's taste or desire on any particular issue. It is, of course, possible
to opt out of a community, but doing so will likely be costly (and force the
individual to find another community).165
Internet communities166 do not include many contrary voices, in part
because it is costless to opt out. Social influence within Internet
communities is likely to strongly reinforce, rather than challenge or channel,
each individual member's existing tastes or predilections.167 In addition,
virtual communities are self-reinforcing. Returning to the sex tourism
165
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example will show the relevance of this point. An Internet-based
community, because it permits people to isolate themselves into selfreinforcing groups defined by a single shared interest, can create an
atmosphere in which members perceive that there is greater lawlessness than
actually exists. A community of sex tourists, or those interested in the
activity, who interact regularly with other sex tourists, have effectively
shrunk their range of influences to the point that they do not receive accurate
information about the general level of lawlessness. Like people who live in
a community plagued by violence, they may come to believe that
misbehavior is common and therefore appropriate.168 Similarly, they may
also inaccurately perceive the likelihood of detection and sanction, which
can further encourage unwanted activity.
The possibility that a person might exit a norms community does not
depend on globalization, but the issue is much more complicated now. Cass
Sunstein cites a high school as an example of a situation in which
individuals can freely exit and enter norms communities.169 He argues that
students can leave a norms community that is not to their liking and form a
new community with more congenial norms.170 This is possible, of course,
but it is not easy, much less costless.
First, students may be able to leave one community and form or join
another, but doing so is not free when the communities are close to each
other. There may be many norms communities within a typical high school,
but all students remain subject to the norms of the other communities
because they cannot avoid interacting with each other. When different
norms communities form within the same geographic community, the
different groups are stuck with each other; leaving one community and
entering another might reduce the power of the first community’s norms, but
it does not eliminate the pull that the norms will have. Those who exit a
community may face the disapproval of others in the first community;
joining a new community may bring similar disapproval (it might also bring
168
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approval). But a student’s every move is apparent to the larger community
and subjects her to the opinions of others, whether they are in her norms
community or not.
Second, students in the hypothetical high school have a variety of
reputations; a student may be known as good at math, bad at soccer, or loyal
in friendship. These reputations may vary in importance to the student--she
may care more about being known as a soccer star than a math whiz--but
none of these reputations is irrelevant. Because she cannot completely opt
out of the larger community, her social standing and the quality of her life
will depend at least in part on the amalgam of her reputations.
Contrast this to the sex tourism example. A tourist who travels from
Chicago to Bangkok can completely (if temporarily) leave behind his old
norms community. His neighbors and acquaintances do not have the
information necessary to express their approval or disapproval for his
actions, leaving them without the power to affect his reputation or otherwise
sanction him. Even if he has opted out of a norms community in his
hometown--imagine, for example, that he left the church to which he used to
belong and no longer cares what its members think of him--he is still
vulnerable to its disapproval because the members of his old community
have the power to influence the members of his new community. When the
different norms communities exist in the same geographic space, even
leaving one community does not make him immune to its influence. The
people with whom he interacts in Bangkok will have more information
about him, but will be less able to affect his reputation. As with the high
school student, the quality of the tourist’s social life will depend, at least in
part, on his reputation. But because he lives most of his life in one place but
seeks pleasure in another, he can segment his reputations and avoid the
sanctions that would otherwise be his due.
As discussed above, when an action violates established norms, there are
several possible ways that a community might react in order to maintain the
vitality of norms and punish the transgressor. One typical initial response is
to try to “ignore or normalize the violation.”171 Observers try to find ways
to reconceptualize the violation as normal activity, or simply do not react. If
this fails, then observers might modify their perceived relationship with the
transgressor, assigning him the role of “norm violator” and taking on the
role of “norm carrier.”172 When the norm carrier confronts the norm
violator, a typical reaction might be to contest the allegation, provide an
171
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excuse for the behavior, or apologize.173
The process of negotiating an account for the transgressive behavior is
vital to maintenance of norms.174 Transgressors who show remorse and
offer an account of their actions “reestablish themselves as a proper person,”
and thereby transform the “infraction into an acceptable act that could be
ignored.”175 Even if the transgressor does not show remorse, that he is
confronted with the violation and responds in some way is essential. Doing
so helps to maintain the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable
behavior, and thereby maintain the vitality of norms. But when the norm
violator is a person of high status, he can exempt himself from the norms
market of the norms carrier. He is never confronted with his misbehavior
and the community never has an opportunity to re-affirm its commitment to
the norm. As I argue in the next part, when the allure of high status is
combined with an interruption in the process of policing norms, the
boundary between acceptable and unacceptable behavior can become blurry
indeed.
B. Prominence, Influence, and Unwanted Activity
Almost anything can come to represent high status.176 Some attributes
or behaviors become status symbols because of their operational utility. For
example, the owner of a cell phone in a place where land telephone lines are
unreliable may see her status rise because she can provide a service that is
otherwise not available.177 But other attributes become status symbols for
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more abstract reasons. Characteristics that are unrelated to survival can
become popular because they are associated with high status. “A person
with status sets the standards and norms by which others will act, and in this
way embodies the goals of a culture.”178 By engaging in behavior
associated with high status, the actor signals to observers that he is of the
same standing as others who engage in the same behavior.179 Because the
actions of those with high status can be seen as symbols of their status,
observers might emulate or adopt the activity in an attempt to cultivate for
themselves higher status.180
A good illustration comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo.181
The DRC is a country of many languages. Swahili is the most common
language spoke in Bukavu, a city in Eastern Congo, though a handful of
local languages are also spoken. Beginning in the 1990s, Lingala, a
language mostly spoken along trade routes and in the capital Kinshasa,
began to emerge as a popular language in Bukavu, which is more than 1000
miles away from Kinshasa.182 There was no linguistic reason for Lingala to
spread to Bukavu because the population’s linguistic needs were already
satisfied by indigenous languages.183 But Lingala did gain a foothold, and
the reason was status. Because it was the language of the capital--a city
viewed by those in the interior to be sophisticated and glamorous--Lingala
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symbolized prestige and high status.184 The desire to emulate the behavior
of those with high status prompted many people in Bukavu to learn a
language that would be of no operational utility to them. This small
example demonstrates a couple of important points. The first is that almost
anything can be a status characteristic.185 The second is that status is a
powerful motivator. People are willing to expend resources to develop a
skill with little functional utility just to increase their status.
Finally, the example shows the complicated relationship of status to
behavior and characteristics. The possession of characteristics associated
with a particular status creates expectations about the behavior of the
individual who has the characteristics. For example, male and white
employees may be assumed to be more competent at job-related tasks than
are women and non-whites.186 But just as status shapes expectations about
behavior, behavior can affect status. People who demonstrate competence
can overcome the expectations associated with their initially low status.187
This process is complicated, but the point I draw is limited: a person who
adopts behaviors associated with high status can thereby enhance her status.
A separate but closely related concern has to do with the role of social
influence. Individuals decide to engage in unwanted activity based on a
number of factors, as discussed above. Among these factors is the
individual’s perception that the activity is common or rare. Scholars have
suggested, most famously in the “Broken Windows” literature,188 that
people who regularly live with indicia of disorder--such as broken windows,
graffiti, or litter--are more likely to commit crimes than those who do not
live with such disorder. "[I]ndividuals are much more likely to commit
crimes when they perceive that criminal activity is widespread,"189 than if

184

Id.

185

See, e.g., Georg Simmel, Fashion, 10 INT’L Q. 130 (1904),
reprinted in 62 AM. J. SOC. 541 (1957).
186

See Webster, Jr. & Hysom, supra note 171, at 373.

187

Id.

188

See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
189

Kahan, supra note 119, at 350.

The New Deterrence

56

they perceive it to be rare. Proponents of "social influence"190 suggest that
there are several reasons it plays a role in the decision to commit a crime:
"the individual rationality of conforming to behavior of other individuals, ...
the reputational benefits of conforming to social norms, and ... a deep-seated
affinity between individuals that causes them to value conformity for its
own sake."191 This position is controversial, and scholars disagree about
what constitutes social influence and the extent to which it actually affects
behavior.192 Scholars such as Dan Kahan argue that people are motivated to
commit crimes when they see indicia of disorder. They do not argue that it
is necessary to actually see others committing similar crimes.193 For
example, people who live in neighborhoods marred by graffiti or litter are
more likely to commit robberies than people who live in cleaner
neighborhoods.
My argument is different in an important way. I argue that social
influence is indeed a powerful force, but that its power is limited to similar
behavior. In other words, people are not motivated to commit robberies by
seeing a lot of litter or graffiti; they are motivated to commit robberies only
if they see (or are aware of) a great number of robberies. Social influence
operates only when activity is observed. The more individuals know about
the actions of others, and the more often they interact with others, the
greater role played by social influence in determining individual choices.
One cannot be influenced by that which one does not perceive; and, all
things being equal, repeated events are more likely to be influential than
single events. Thus, my modified social influence argument suggests that if
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observers notice an increase in the kinds of illicit sexual behavior associated
with sex tourism, then local people would be influenced to engage in similar
activity.194
Understanding the power of status shows the importance of this
argument to the deterrence of transnational crimes. Members of a
community witness the behavior of countless people every day. But not all
behavior is equally influential. The actions of some members of the
community are more likely to affect the behavior of observers than are the
actions of other members. Some norms scholars have recognized this fact,
but their conception of the phenomenon omits an important consideration.
Robert Ellickson has put forth the most convincing description of the
emergence of norms.195 He argues that a social norm “is not the product of
‘diffuse social forces.’” Instead, norms result from the “purposive actions of
discrete individuals, especially those who are particularly suited to
providing the new rule and those who are particularly eager to have it
adopted.”196 Under this view, new norms are created by those who expect to
benefit from the new way of doing things.197 Ellickson names “selfmotivated leaders,”198 “norm entrepreneurs,”199 and “opinion leaders”200 as
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examples of “change agents”201--those who supply new norms. Although he
describes important differences between types, each is thought to act
intentionally. Ellickson argues that those who supply new norms do so
because they expect to benefit from the new rule, and are therefore willing
to pay a price (or forego current benefits for future gains) because of the
payoffs the new norm will bring them.
By considering only purposive action, this conception of the creation of
norms ignores the important role of status. Ellickson’s description of the
role of “change agents” incorporates much of the social science literature on
opinion leaders.202 They are the people whom others follow. Those who
study marketing spend a lot of time trying to identify the characteristics of
opinion leaders.203 They have identified at least one essential trait: public
individuation.204 This means the extent to which “people feel differentiated,
to some degree, from other people and choose to act differently from
them.”205 Importantly, public individuation is not necessarily purposive. It
“involves behaviors that get attention, regardless of the underlying
motive.”206 It is here that status become relevant. Those with high status-particularly outsiders--are socially prominent; their behavior is observed
more closely than that of other people. Like it or not, they are “publicly
individuated,” and they act as opinion leaders. They do not necessarily
create new norms purposefully, but because of their status and prominence,
their behavior is influential.
Recent behavioral science research highlights a final factor that can
undermine the power of norms to regulate behavior. Economists have long
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recognized that relative income and relative status can be powerful
determinants of well-being.207 People care not just about their absolute level
of wealth or status, but also about how they measure up against others. But
economists have only recently recognized that the “others” against whom
people measure themselves--their reference standards--are at least in part
consciously chosen.208 People are thought to choose reference standards to
fulfill two goals: “self-enhancement” and “self-improvement.”209 Selfenhancement is a downward comparison; people seek to feel better by
comparing themselves to those who are less competent or have less money
or a lower status.210 Self-improvement is an upward comparison; people
compare themselves to those who are more competent in order to improve
their own performance.211 Globalization broadens the opportunity to
“choose the Joneses” against whom one wishes to compare social standing.
C. Status Distorts the Process of Judgment and Disapproval
The reaction of observers to unwanted activity depends not just on the
act, but also on the status, characteristics, and history of the person engaging
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in the activity.212 For example, there is empirical evidence that people of
high status are treated less harshly than people of low status for violations of
the law. High-status offenders might expect to receive less severe
punishment than low-status offenders for the same behavior. But the affect
of status appears to go beyond differential reactions to acknowledged
violations of the law (or norms). Status appears to distort the very process
of judging. Observers are less likely to conclude that a given act is deviant
when it is engaged in by a person of high status rather than a person of low
status.213 An act that is unacceptable when committed by a person with low
status can be acceptable when committed by a person with high status. Not
surprisingly, this effect is greater for acts that are normatively
questionable.214 Indeed, some behavioral science evidence suggests that
high status persons are judged less harshly for minor transgressions but
more harshly for major transgressions than people with low status.215
There are several possible reasons for the distorting effect of high status.
First, high status is often bestowed upon people who make positive
contributions to the community. Regardless of whether the contributions are
economic, social, or cultural, those who contribute most to the community
can receive greater rewards--or less disapproval--than those who contribute
less.216
Related to this is the fear that a person who makes a
disproportionate contribution to the community will withdraw his
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contribution if he is judged harshly for his deviant behavior.217 The sex
tourism example provides some evidence to support this point. The money
foreign tourists spend thought to contribute significantly to the local
economy, and their behavior is seen as the price of their contribution to the
local economy.
Another possible explanation for the effect status has on judgment is the
risk of retaliation more generally. In addition to fearing that a high-status
person will withhold his contributions, observers might also fear that the
high-status person might retaliate in other ways.218 This fear recognizes that
people with high status often have greater social power and greater ability to
influence legal authorities.
The second aspect of the distortion argument relates to the interaction
between observers’ expectations and their reactions to behavior. There are
several ways that expectations shape reactions. First, observers are less
likely to disapprove of the actions of a person for whom they already have
low expectations than they are when they see a stranger (or someone for
whom they have high expectations) engage in the same behavior.219
“Unexpected unpleasant behavior produces greater annoyance and
disappointment than the same behavior would if expected.”220 Indeed, the
greater the distance between the observer’s expectations and the observed
behavior, the more likely it is that observers will condemn the behavior.221
Second, observers are more likely to sanction a transgressor if they believe
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that he knew that his actions were causing harm.222 Observers thus impute
knowledge to the transgressor and judge his actions based in part on the
imputed knowledge. Finally, observers are more likely to draw a negative
conclusion about a transgressor if they conclude that his high status
facilitated the deviant act.223
The sex tourism example shows the importance of these arguments in
two spheres--reaction to the action, and reaction to the actor. Because the
actions of people with high status can come to symbolize high status and
prompt others to emulate them, their actions can change the attitudes of
local people about the activity. If people with high status continue to
engage in behavior that was formerly considered deviant, the act can lose its
deviant status. This can have several consequences. One is that local
people might become more likely to engage in it. The deviant acts of
Westerners can thus increase the overall amount of deviant activity. A
second consequence is that as local people lose their disapproval for an
activity, they are less likely to report transgressions to law enforcement,
which reduces the cost of the activity for the actor.
Transnational activity, especially activity that is normatively
problematic, involves the creation of an identity. Local people with limited
experience with Westerners do not have firm expectations about how they
will behave. But as there is more contact, expectations form. It is essential
to deterrence policy that expectations form in a way that produces healthy
norms. If local people come to expect Westerners to engage in illicit sexual
activity, it is much less likely that those engaging in the behavior will pay
any social cost for their transgression. As the cost of engaging in the
activity goes down, the incidence of the activity is likely to go up. But if
local people come to believe that Westerners are able to engage in illicit
sexual activity because of their high status, or that Westerners know that
they are causing harm when they engage in the activity, it is more likely that
local people will disapprove of the behavior and impose some sort of
sanction.
V. CONCLUSION
Globalization has changed the reality of criminal opportunities and
behavior, but theory has not kept up. This Article has been the first attempt
to think through these changes and what they should mean for deterrence
theory. Building on the theoretical insights developed above, I take a first
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step toward recommending changes in policy.
By drawing on the rigorous models of law-and-economics and the rich
detail of criminology literature, I have attempted to arrive at a more helpful
approach. For deterrence policy, the goal of developing any model of
behavior is to identify points of intervention--those factors that reduce the
appeal of criminal behavior or increase the appeal of legitimate activity.
Identifying these points of intervention is essential policy because it is at
these points that we can target policy initiatives. In economic terms, the
goal is to increase the cost of criminal activity; criminology helps us identify
the costs.
I have identified several factors that we must consider in assessing the
costs of an effective deterrence policy. The first are the informal costs of
apprehension. These can take the form of social disapprobation, feelings of
guilt, or loss of social position. Regardless of their form, the risk of
suffering such a sanction can operate as a cost, reducing the attractiveness of
unwanted behavior. The next set of costs are those associated with the
substitution process. This process is complicated and fraught with risks for
potential offenders, making it a potentially powerful target of regulation.
Within the substitution process, there are several important elements to
consider. One is where potential offenders obtain the expertise that will
allow them to move into the new area of activity. This information can
come from personal experience or it can come from the experience of
others. Another key element is the question of norms. It is important to
recognize that different activities are subject to different norms, and that
people who are willing to commit one kind of crime may not be willing to
commit another.
Finally, we must consider the critical role that status can play in
transnational crime. Status is important in several ways. It is more difficult
to enforce social norms against people who are able to exempt themselves
from the relevant norms community, either because their status makes them
immune from the opprobrium of those whom they have offended or because
they can simply leave the area. Status is also important because the actions
of people of high status can come to symbolize their status. Attitudes,
tangible goods, and personal activities can all come to represent high status,
and can inspire others to seek or emulate the status symbols. Finally, status
matters because it can distort the process of judgment. The activities of
those with high status are often judges less severely than the activities of
those with lower status.
What does this mean for policy? This is, of course, a complicated
question whose answer will vary for each country and each kind of activity.
The first answer is simply to expand the list of policy responses. Globalized
activity is not as simple as local crime, and the responses cannot be as
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simple. This means shifting the focus from tinkering with the length of a
prison sentence to considering thornier issues, like disrupting the flow of
information between sex tourists. That sex tourists are able to obtain
expertise for free reduces their costs and makes the activity more attractive.
Law enforcement officials should increase the cost of gathering information
by shutting down news groups or Usenet sites, for example.224 Another way
to attack the flow of information is to target organized tour companies.225
Those who work as intermediaries facilitate the industry, and targeting them
could reduce the attractiveness of such travel to sex tourists.
Another set of responses centers around status and norms. Again,
information is critical. The desire to maintain a positive reputation is an
important motivation for many people to comply with norms. Sex tourists
are able to segment their reputations and avoid the disapprobation they
would otherwise deserve because the people who witness their illicit activity
are not able to communicate with the home geographic community of
Western tourists. This reduces the cost to the tourist and makes the activity
more appealing. One way to give local people access to a sex tourist’s
reputation is to provide for some kind of shaming penalty. For example, if a
person is arrested in a sex tourism destination country, law enforcement
officials might publicize the arrest in the suspect’s home town in the West.
Such shaming penalties are not uncomplicated, of course, but might provide
a way to prevent potential offenders from segmenting their reputations. A
related response would be to publicize the issue of sex tourism in destination
countries. Examining the role of status highlights the importance of
bystanders in the maintenance of norms. Without the active participation of
bystanders, norms against illicit sexual activity cannot be maintained. And,
as we have see, the role of status complicates the participation of local
bystanders. If law enforcement officials publicly endorsed the norms
against such activity, local bystanders would be empowered and would be
more likely to notice and act against such activity.
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Finally, and perhaps most critically, it is possible to modify the
substantive criminal law to make it more responsive to the potential for
displacement. One good example of such a change is the increase in what
are essentially long-arm statutes. These statutes allow a source country to
punish a citizen for his actions outside the country.226 Some source
countries go further and restrict the travel of convicted sex offenders.227 All
of these measures are ways for a source country to account for the true costs
of its regulations and help to prevent the spread of unwanted activity. These
sorts of measures require us to do the important work of thinking about
crime and crime prevention globally, with an eye toward truly reducing it,
rather than shifting it to countries less capable of combating it.
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